The Need for Theoretical Knowledge in Architectural Practice by Marcus, Lars
Lars Marcus:The need for theoretical knowledge in architectural practice 37
Lars Marcus
The need for theoretical knowledge
in architectural practice
A rchitecture is epistemolo-gically a complex field and there is not a com-
mon understanding of its nature, 
not even among people working within it. On the cont-
rary it is a field where various forms of knowledge meet, 
the relations of which are seldom investigated. This 
often leads to dichotomic statements from advocates 
of different standpoints, between representatives of 
an artistic or a scientific approach to the subject, for 
instance. One theme in the work of Bill Hillier is to de-
epen our understanding of architectural knowledge 
and its internal entities and relations, and to reconcile 
uch unproductive conflicts. This article draws exten-
sively on the two first chapters of Hillier’s Space is the 
machine (titled respectively ‘What architecture adds 
to building’ and ‘The need for an analytical theory of 
architecture’).1 My aim is, first, to point out the urgent 
need for scientific research within architecture, and, 
second, to indicate exactly where such knowledge is 
useful in architectural practice.
A century of architectural building
Looking back at the twentieth century it is possible to 
say that it was the century when man finally conquered 
the world and changed the face of it. What in the be-
ginning of that century was fundamentally a natural 
world, a world where most of its content was so to say 
given, became transformed so that the world we now 
live in and experience to a high degree is an artificial 
world, a world constructed by man. Thus, it is possible 
that if the twentieth century in many respects was the 
century of natural science, the present century will be 
that of what Herbert Simon has called the science of 
the artificial.2 We have learned a great deal about the 
natural world, but as the artificial is increasingly part of 
it, we also need to learn more about the artificial.
One obvious, major area within which this man-
made world has been shaped is construction and 
building; never before did we build as much as in the 
twentieth century. But let the sheer quantity not blind us 
to an equally important qualitative change. One of the 
most noticeable features of construction in the twen-
tieth century is the degree of architectural building. 
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By architectural building I simply mean building that 
is the result of the work and specific competence of 
architects. Previously such buildings have been margi-
nal, even if often the architectural building alone has 
become permanent and noticed by posterity. Over pre-
vious centuries, most buildings have been “traditional” 
or “popular” or, to use a better expression, vernacular. 
This means a building that is not based on the type of 
specialist knowledge represented by architects, but 
knowledge that is part of a more general cultural tradi-
tion.3 The purpose underlying such a distinction is not 
to make a value judgement of the type that architectu-
ral building is qualitatively better than vernacular, but 
rather to make the important observation following 
Hillier, that the different kinds of buildings derive from 
different types of knowledge.4 It is when we become 
conscious of this fundamental difference that we can 
begin to understand what is specific to the field of 
building in our time and, furthermore, what this en-
tails for architectural practice as well as architectural 
research.
Another noticeable feature of building during the 
twentieth century is its high degree of failure.5 This is 
not intended as a dismissive remark. To begin with it 
is difficult to find examples of vernacular building in 
history that can be said to have been failures. In effect, 
this is an inevitable consequence of the very definition 
of vernacular building, as a direct spatial response to 
local needs and values in the cultural context from 
which it emerges. Technically, there have certainly 
been shortcomings, but it is difficult to talk about func-
tional or aesthetic failures in a more fundamental sense. 
The architectural building of the twentieth century, by 
contrast, has been continuously criticised on both the 
functional and aesthetic planes, and has even been 
accused of actively contributing to many social pro-
blems. I am not saying here that vernacular building 
is “more natural” and therefore “better” than architec-
tural building. What I want to draw attention to is how 
architectural building is in need of a particular form of 
knowledge and how this should be reflected in archi-
tectural practice and architectural research.
The characteristics of architectural building
The reason why architectural building sometimes can 
be said to fail while the vernacular by definition almost 
never does, arises from the fact that they emerge from 
different kinds of knowledge. If we begin by looking 
more closely at these types of knowledge, it also be-
comes possible to arrive at a better understanding of 
what I mean by failure in this context.
The vernacular building can be described as a type 
of knowledge that derives from craftsmanship that is 
slowly developed over generations through the use 
of a bank of practical knowledge that is transferred 
from individual to individual through practical expres-
sion. Proven solutions with a known outcome are trans-
ferred over time. Changes are introduced slowly, and 
their practical expression is tested before being adop-
ted or rejected. Of course, conceptual leaps occur, but 
the vernacular mode depends to an overwhelming 
extent on the slow development of knowledge ba-
sed on proven experience. The development of such 
knowledge, furthermore, occurs in a given social and 
cultural context, which directly reflects the needs 
and values established within it. The social order, 
in this way, is given physical expression in the spatial 
order and the opposite, the spatial order supports the 
social order. We can even say that the spatial order is 
one of the more important means by which the social 
order reproduces itself.6 The close ties between both 
of these orders in vernacular building enable me to 
claim that in principle the vernacular building is never 
a failure, but in its given context is always satisfying. 
When it is not, it is usually exactly in relation to major 
social changes, which thus make the spatial solutions 
in question obsolete. We thus see major similarities 
between knowledge in vernacular building and what 
we call skills or, to use the Aristotelian term, techne, or 
knowledge of how one does something.7
To be dependant on traditional forms is neverthe-
less almost a negation of architecture, since architec-
ture is largely valued on the basis of its capacity for 
innovation and the formulation of new solutions. Ar-
chitectural knowledge is expressed almost in the op-
posite way to the vernacular, namely in its capacity to 
be creative rather than derivative. As Hillier points out, 
to copy is one of the greatest taboos in architecture—
he is not speaking of conscious loans— while it in many 
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cases is exactly what is looked for in the vernacular.8 
At a deeper level this difference is concerned with the 
greater consciousness in architectural knowledge with 
the principal ideas from which one acts. We can very well 
imagine that even architects work by deriving ideas 
from older types of buildings, but the difference is that 
they are conscious of what they are doing. For them it 
is thus a question of a conscious choice among various 
approaches. It is these conscious choices between 
different theoretically possible options that, howe-
ver, do not occur in vernacular building.9
This also tells us something about the way that 
architectural knowledge is transmitted. It differs from 
the vernacular in the way that it is not necessarily trans-
mitted through practical experience from individual 
to individual, even if this also takes place, but largely 
with the assistance of theoretically formulated ideas. 
Underlying practically all greater architectural inno-
vation during the twentieth century are more or less 
interlinked theories, which seek to inspire architectural 
work to take new directions (even if perhaps the ac-
tual constructions related to these theories play an 
even greater role). What is typical for such theories or 
constructions is a lack of connection to a clear social 
context. On the contrary, what is innovative often con-
sists of transferring and applying ideas from one con-
text to another, or setting parts of different contexts 
into new totalities. Architectural knowledge is thus 
based on ideas or theoretically based in a way that we 
cannot say applies to the vernacular. To put it in Hillier’s 
uncompromising words: ‘architecture is theory applied 
to building’.10 This means that architects can be said to 
work at a theoretical level, that they make innovative 
choices that do not simply emerge from the cultural 
context in which they exist or from the practical tradi-
tion to which they belong, but that they also borrow 
from other contexts or develop solutions along new 
principles. We can thus, in contrast to the vernacular, 
see how architectural knowledge resembles what we 
usually call scientific knowledge or episteme, that it is 
not simply knowledge of how one does something, 
but also the principle behind it or why one does it.11
The problem with architectural building
But it is exactly here where the problems arise with 
building based on architectural knowledge. It is, as we 
saw, a form of knowledge that is proficient at genera-
ting new spatial orders or transposing existing ones 
into new contexts. Nevertheless, for obvious reasons, 
there is a lack of an experiential basis for such solutions 
of the kind that exist in vernacular knowledge. This 
makes it difficult to predict how the solutions that archi-
tects work with will be accepted and function in the 
social orders in which they are to be applied. The links 
between these two orders is thus, in contrast to the si-
tuation in the vernacular, very weak. This is the reason 
I think, that buildings of the twentieth century, largely 
of the architectural type, have encountered so many 
failures. In the social and cultural contexts in which 
such buildings have been erected, the aesthetic ideals 
that they represent have often been obscure and their 
functional solutions directly unsuitable. The strength 
of architectural knowledge thus lies in its generative ca-
pacity, while it demonstrates a noticeable weakness in 
predictive capacity.12
In vernacular building, the opposite condition tends 
to apply. As we saw, it avoids predictive problems largely 
through relying on known solutions with familiar out-
comes. Internal development, is characterised by slow, 
small steps, so that what is new (and its outcome) can 
be tested by degrees and become known.13 However, 
vernacular knowledge has difficulties in being gene-
rative, or in renewing and developing itself in a more 
radical sense and often has conservative features. As 
Alexander states, it relies on knowledge that in prin-
ciple is unconscious of its theoretical base and thus 
has difficulties in discovering alternative possibilities 
and ways of relating.14 Knowledge in the vernacular 
building thus, in direct contrast to architectural know-
ledge, has its strength in its predictive capacity and its 
weakness in the generative.
It is, however, important to recognise that these li-
nes describe general conditions. There is a more tacit 
development of knowledge, like that encountered 
in the vernacular, even in architectural building, just 
as developmental leaps occur in the vernacular and 
not only in the architectural. My intention here is, of 
course, to point to general differences.
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The need of theory for architectural building
Something which architectural knowledge appears to 
lack is thus a theory of the relations between spatial 
orders and social orders. This may appear to be surpri-
sing in regard to Hillier’s statement that what distinguis-
hes architectural knowledge is precisely its theoretical 
approach. Yet theory can imply many things; there is 
thus reason to look more closely at what is meant by 
theory in this context.
Hillier distinguishes between two types of theory 
within architecture, which are closely linked to two 
elements of what architects actually do and are expec-
ted to be good at.15 We can in general terms say that 
architects in design processes primarily do two things; 
on the one hand they devise architectural solutions—
the generative phase—and on the other they make 
predictions about the outcomes of these solutions—
the predictive phase. In practical work a continuous 
interaction naturally takes place between these ele-
ments. What is important is to see that architects need 
theoretical support in both these elements, but above 
all that the theory in both cases must be of different ty-
pes. In the first case, it is theory that helps architects to 
see how the architectural solutions they are working 
with can be developed, renewed, put together in an-
other way or be replaced by new ones. Such theories 
can be characterised as speculative theories in a posi-
tive sense, that is theories that attempt to see assump-
tions in a new way — or theories of possibility as Hillier 
puts it.16 Such theories we know amongst other things 
from art, where the various manifestos of modernism 
are good examples.
Yet architects also need theories to help them with 
the other element, namely the predictable outcome of 
the architectural forms and solutions that they propo-
se. To make such predictions, there are only two ways 
to take, either to refer to previous examples, or to refer 
to some principle.17 Here we can see the advantages 
of vernacular knowledge: it can always follow the first 
path and refer to earlier examples within the building 
tradition to which it belong. In principle, the outcomes 
of the solutions that are used are always known. Within 
architecture this is impossible as one generally wants 
to create what has not been seen before. An archi-
tectural building is, by definition, unique. This means 
that it is impossible to refer to earlier examples since 
they simply do not exist. What remains is to refer to a 
principle, that is to say, to some form of architectural 
theory.
Traditional architectural theory
Hillier further points to the fact that if we look more 
closely at what is generally called architectural theory, 
we shall see that it predominantly consists of theo-
ries which largely have been successful in the ge-
nerative phase while having serious problems in the 
predictive.18 This is because architectural theory such 
as we know it from Alberti to Koolhaas has generally 
been of a speculative type, which as we have seen can 
provide support particularly in the generative phase of 
the architects’ work. Yet speculative theories cannot be 
a support in the predictive phase since we are no long-
er interested in how something might be, but want 
to know how something actually is or will become. 
This phase in the work of the architect quite simply 
needs the support of theory in a more rigorous sense, 
namely scientifically based or analytical theory.19 Such 
analytical architectural theory is, however, unusual 
and has often come to be replaced by speculative 
theory extended beyond its limits. This makes it clear 
why I found it necessary to stress how architectural 
knowledge resembles scientific knowledge. Rather we 
can say that architectural knowledge often acquires a 
pseudo-epistemic character, which means that it tries 
to explain why something is done, but on the whole 
does this on rather insecure grounds.
To illustrate this, we can take Louis Sullivan’s senten-
ce form follows function as an example of a compres-
sed type of theory that has had great significance for 
architectural building during the twentieth century. 
This sentence is of a clearly speculative type, as it helps 
us to look at architectural form in a special way. This 
makes it a theory that can provide very sound support 
to an architect who is concerned with generating ideas 
for suitable forms for an architectural problem; as such 
it has been particularly fruitful. However, it has very litt-
le to tell us when it comes to predicting the outcome 
of these forms even if this sentence can beguile us into 
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believing that a function almost automatically leads to 
a relevant form, and that this form in turn supports the 
desired function. This, however, would be to stretch 
the theory beyond its carrying capacity. Should this 
occur, its limits in these respects are revealed.
To take an example from the world of artefacts, we 
can see how the idea of differentiating between the 
functions of walls into two systems (on the one hand 
bearing and on the other spatially dividing — in the 
form of pillared decks and light walls) has been a parti-
cularly fruitful idea that has facilitated freer forms and 
new opportunities within building during the twen-
tieth century. Yet to link this idea with predictability of 
the outcome, namely that such a separation in some 
way will lead to greater flexibility, which, it is often 
maintained, is something that experience has shown 
to be considerably more problematic. Such potential 
flexibility has seldom acquired the significance expec-
ted. We face once again a speculative idea, which in a 
generative respect has been very successful, but which 
in a predictive respect has created both misunderstan-
dings and mistakes.
In a predictive respect, traditional architectural the-
ory has thus generally been weak and has not managed 
to provide suitable support. With the lack both of 
previous examples and a reliable theory, it is just in 
the predictive respect that architectural building can 
more specifically be said to have failed.
The relation of theoretical knowledge   
to the architect’s experiential knowledge
Despite the obvious lack of knowledge in this regard, 
there is considerable scepticism, not least among ar-
chitects, as to whether the development of such know-
ledge and theory is possible or even desirable. That 
such a development does not seem to be possible, may 
quite simply depend on our seeing so little successful 
theory; that it is not desired, may depend on it appea-
ring as though the intention behind such theoretical 
development would be to replace the architect’s crea-
tive work with researched norms and algorithms. This 
is, however, a naive perception and again involves the 
confusion of different kinds of knowledge. Scientific 
knowledge always speaks at the level of principles or 
how something relates in general, while the architect’s 
knowledge is, to a great degree, experiential know-
ledge, which identifies what to do in a specific case. 
Here we encounter a third form of knowledge, namely 
discernment or fronesis, that entails knowledge which 
does not deal so much with how or why one does so-
mething, but rather when one should do it.20
This means that no kind of knowledge can be repla-
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ced by any of the others, on the contrary, they are re-
markably dependent on each other. Though each indi-
vidual case is unique, this does not mean that in these 
cases knowledge of a more general kind cannot be 
applied. At the same time, general knowledge cannot 
show us how it should be applied in the individual case. 
In practice, architects always work at both these levels, 
as what they actually do is to apply generally applica-
ble knowledge in a specific form in the individual case; 
the relevant question being how well founded the 
general or theoretical knowledge actually is. Scientific 
knowledge thus provides support in the form of know-
ledge principles when one’s own experience of earlier 
examples is no longer sufficient to give the required 
answers. Responsibility for how such knowledge is 
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applied in the individual case rests with the architect 
though and, as always, it is exactly here where her/his 
qualities as an architect are revealed.
Thus there is no innate rivalry between theory and 
practice in architecture, between episteme and tech-
ne/fronesis. Rather it is obvious how the develop-
ment of scientifically-based knowledge and theory 
concerning the predictive phase in architectural work 
is of great interest for architectural practice just as it is a 
vital task for architectural research. As a matter of fact, 
against the background of the failures of the twentieth 
century, it is nothing less than a necessity if one is to be 
able to promote the skill and expertise of the architect. 
Neither would such a development hamper the creati-
ve freedom of the architect. Rather it would define the 
field of the possible—i.e. give the architect’s creativity 
precision and strength.
Notes
1. Bill Hillier: Space is the machine, Cambridge 1996.
2. Herbert Simon: The Science of the Artificial, Cambridge 
Mass. 1969.
3. A more familiar distinction with a similar purpose might 
be Christopher Alexander’s between buildings as a result 
of “unselfconscious processes” and buildings as a result of 
“self-conscious processes”, as put forward in Notes on the 
Synthesis of Form. The particular with construction and 
building in the twentieth century would then be the un-
precedented quantity that is the result of self-conscious 
processes. Christopher Alexander: Notes on the Synthe-
sis of Form, Cambridge Mass. 1964.
4. Hillier, 1996, 15–53.
5. Once again a theme of Alexander’s.
6. Hillier, 1996, p. 43.
7. Here and in the following I use the Aristotelian concepts 
of knowledge as put forth in chapter 6 of the Nicomache-
an Ethics. Most revealing and helpful I have found José 
Luis Ramírez thorough discussion and interpretation 
of these concepts in: Skapande mening (Creative Mea-
ning), (Nordplan Dissertation 13:2), Stockholm 1995. For 
a discussion on techne, see p. 49–110.
8. Hillier, 1996, p. 17.
9. Hillier, 1996, p. 46.
10. Hillier, 1996, p. 51.
11. Ramírez, 1995, p. 17–48.
12. Hillier, 1996, p. 65.
13. Alexander rather stresses the immediacy between the 
act of building and the act of use. Alexander, 1964, p. 
48–52.
14. Alexander, 1964, p. 34.
15. Hillier, 1996, p. 59–65 and 441–445.
16. Hillier, 1996, p. 63.
17. Hillier, 1996, p. 62.
18. Hillier, 1996, p.65–68.
19. Hillier, 1996, p. 57.
20. Ramírez, 1995, p. 111–186.
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